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ABSTRACT
With The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality, Ayelet Shachar is the first
major scholar to put the rich theory of property law theory to work in the realm of citi-
zenship. Assessed on its own criteria, the book delivers on its promise to shake up our
thinking on this question.Nevertheless,I argue in this paper that her account is not ulti-
matelypersuasive.First,Shachar takesforgranted that citizenshipisavaluableresource.
I suggest that today legal residency is more highly valued that citizenship. Also her de-
fense of the state and the social advantages of having stable citizenship regimes does
nothingtoconfront itsdeclineasthecentralorganizingprincipleofpoliticallife.Last but
not least,themodalitiesofabirthright citizenshiplevycallsintoquestiontheunderlying
analysis.For instance,the current proposal looks undistinguishable from foreign aid and
it would demand much more robust institutional organs of global governance that now
exist.Thesecondprongofherargument worksat thedomesticlevelasit tacklesthepro-
blem of under- and over-inclusiveness of birthright citizenship. Here too I have reserva-
tions highlighted by modes of implementation.
RÉSUMÉ
Avec The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality, Ayelet Shachar est la pre-
mière chercheuse de pointe qui utilise la riche théorie du droit de propriété dans le do-
mainedelacitoyenneté.Jugéàl’aunedesesprincipes,lelivreréussit àsecouernosidées
reçues sur cette question. Dans cet article, je soutiens néanmoins que son explication
n’est pasaussiconvaincantequ’elleenal’air.D’abordparcequ’elletendàsurévaluerlaci-
toyenneté.Larésidencepermanenteest aujourd’huiplusendemandeet apourcetterai-
son plus de valeur que la citoyenneté. Ensuite, parce que la défense de l’État et des
avantages sociaux des régimes de citoyenneté stables ne fait rien pour remédier au dé-
clindel’État entant queprincipeorganisateurdelaviepolitique.Enfin,parcequelesmo-
dalités d’une taxe sur la transmission de la citoyenneté par droit de naissance ne
permettent pas de la distinguer la taxe sur la citoyenneté de l’aide étrangère et que sa
mise en œuvre impliquerait des institutions de gouvernance globale plus robustes que
celles qui existent actuellement. Le volet domestique de la proposition de Shachar, qui
viseàcorrigerlesproblèmesdesous-inclusionet desur-inclusionàl’aidedujusnexi,pose
également quelques difficultés.J’émets des réserves qui portent sur la mise en œuvre de
cette proposition.
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2Ayelet Shachar’s The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality is an
exceptionally important work from one of the leading theorists of citizenship law.
It introduces a radical and compelling new framework for confronting the dilem-
mas of birthright citizenship, one that promises to transform debates in the area.
The book frames birthright citizenship as a matter of inherited property. The
vast majority of the world’s population acquires citizenship by transmission at
birth, on the basis of parentage or territorial location at time of birth. To the ex-
tent that citizenship is a valuable resource, then, it is secured on the basis of
morally irrelevant criteria. Birthright citizenship is not merely inherited property,
but an untaxed form of inherited property. Drawing from property theory, the
book thus sets up the moral problem of the unburdened intergenerational trans-
mission of citizenship.
This is powerful stuff. Shachar is the first major scholar to put the rich theory of
property law theory to work in the realm of citizenship. Taken on its premise, it
is a highly successful effort. Citizenship theory is ripe for destabilization, and the
book delivers on its promise to shake up our thinking on the question.
Which is not to say that the account is ultimately persuasive. First, Shachar
works from the premise that citizenship is a valuable resource. This is a con-
testable proposition. Few rights remain distinctively contingent on citizenship
status. The book at points conflates the value of legal residency and citizenship
status. Legal residents enjoy almost all rights extended to citizens. Even the fran-
chise, which is conventionally conceived as a singular privilege of citizenship,
is commonly extended to legal residents, at least in local elections. Other rights
of political participation, including the capacity to make campaign contribu-
tions, are also available to legal residents. There are otherwise few contexts in
which legal residency comprises a disability. Most importantly, legal residency
affords the right of entry, which diminishes the costs of transborder mobility
(relative to those not enjoying such rights, who may be able to cross borders but
at a much higher price). Undocumented status may be a serious disability, but
that disability is mostly cured with regularization. Citizenship is more in the
way of an afterthought. Legal residency is more highly valued than citizenship.
This can be demonstrated in the property frames of The Birthright Lottery.I na
hypothetical auction, green cards would fetch a high price from those otherwise
ineligible for territorial admission. In some countries, including Canada and the
United States, legal residency can be secured through investments; in other
words, one can buy residency rights. Even at fairly steep prices (in the U.S., one
million dollars) there are takers. Citizenship, by contrast, might well go beg-
ging. If decoupled from legal residency, that is, if one could buy citizenship on
an a la carte basis discretely from legal residency, the price would be low. In the
United States, there is anecdotal evidence that a steep increase in naturalization
fees has deterred some otherwise eligible individuals from applying for citizen-
ship. In other words, some individuals do not perceive U.S. citizenship to be
worth even a thousand dollars, much less a million.Assume Shachar’s birthright
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2citizenship levy was exacted on an individual basis. Many permanent resident
aliens would refrain from naturalization, against the prospect of a tax from which
they would otherwise be exempted. Depending on the size of the tax, one could
imagine some native-born citizens renouncing their nationality. This demon-
strates that citizenship is not in fact ‘priceless’(as the U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tice EarlWarren once characterized it). Indeed it may not be worth all that much
going forward.
The Birthright Lottery thus works from nationalist premises, in the just-liberal
sense. That position can no longer be taken as natural, and the book ably de-
fends the state “and the enormous social advantages of having stable citizenship
regimes”. Shachar concedes the appeal of an unbundling of citizenship, in which
territory, authority, and rights (in Saskia Sassen’s frame)1 are decoupled, and the
accompanying emergence of transnational identities and internationally-pro-
tected rights. She sees these as complementing, not replacing, the shelter and
solidarity of the state; and she implicitly dismisses those scholars who engage
the unbundling as “celebrat[ing] the demise of protected membership in a col-
lective political enterprise” (67-68).
But the better postnational thinking is not so much celebrating the decline of the
state as the location of identity and governance as confronting the fact of its de-
cline. There is a whiff of both fear and wishful thinking in the liberal national-
ist meme. The international system of rights and redistribution remains at best
provisional; it is not yet up to the task of substituting for the state in its now re-
fined, justice-advancing capacities. (The riff on Churchill might be: The state is
the worst form of community, except for all the alternatives.) We hope that the
state will remain stable as the central organizing principle of political life. But
that will not make it so. There are powerful material forces on the ground that
are working to undermine the state as the locus of community, forces that go
largely unexamined in this book. To the extent that there is a legible trajectory
away from segmentation among states, that is a shortcoming. Global norms and
institutions are far from substituting for state-based equivalents, but the relative
importance is hardly static. Long term, the state appears in irreversible decline.
The sooner that scholars train their sights on the emerging, unformed institu-
tions (and their shortcomings) of that new order, the better. State-based models
are likely to be legacy paradigms, salient today (“tak[ing] the world as we find
it”) (104), less so tomorrow.
Shachar’s proposal is inventive nonetheless, seeking to maintain the best of the
state as a force for internal community redistribution while confronting issues of
inter-community justice.The concept of a birthright citizenship levy is provoca-
tive in the best sense of the term. The modalities are another matter. One should
not measure a new theoretic by its practicalities (the best academic writing al-
ways pushes thinking beyond the policymaking horizon), but in this case the
difficulty of implementation raises questions about the underlying analysis.The
book proposes that the tax be progressive as extracted within wealthy countries
subject to the levy (99). But that again puts the premise of valuable citizenship
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2into question: if it is valuable in itself, why not individually tax the poorest of
the rich, as it were? If not, what does that say about the real value of citizenship
status?
The suggestion that the tax be administered on a state-to-state basis, moreover,
makes the proposal look indistinguishable from foreign aid as we have long
known it, that is, as a mechanism for correcting inequality on a community-to-
community basis (which would seem justified on grounds having nothing nec-
essarily to do with citizenship status). The upshot starts to look more like a
‘global income tax’than a ‘global citizenship tax’. Among other issues here: if
the tax is exacted at the level of the state, it will include tax payments made by
non-citizens, thus detaching it from the citizenship frame. Shachar’s frame does
add a distinctive intellectual girder for other justice-based approaches to inter-
national redistribution. As with other such proposals, the administration of the
scheme would be daunting, to say the least. The book offers some formulas for
deciding which countries would get taxed and which would receive the pro-
ceeds, but those would obviously be hotly contested. Who would get to decide?
The United Nations? Shachar dismisses world government, appropriately, but
her scheme would demand much more robust institutional organs of global gov-
ernance than now exist. The suggestion of in-kind service substitutions, while
normatively appealing, would only compound the difficulty of administration.
Again, this is not to dismiss the book’s powerful theoretical challenge, but it
does draw the analytical premises into question.
The book’s discussion of birthright citizenship in the global context alone makes
this an important work. The concluding chapters on the domestic place of birth
citizenship add significant extra value. Here Shachar highlights the under- and
overinclusiveness of birth citizenship: underinclusive to the extent that many
who are members of the community as a matter of social fact do not enjoy citi-
zenship, overinclusive to the extent that some emigrants who maintain little con-
nection to the community continue to hold citizenship on the basis of descent
(‘hollow citizens’).The book calls for a squaring of citizenship with actual com-
munity on the basis of ‘jus nexi’, by extending citizenship to the former group
and denying it to the latter. Once again the argument effectively draws from
property law concepts. The application of the doctrine of adverse possession to
the position of undocumented aliens presents a particularly compelling argu-
ment for justifying the extension of citizenship to individuals even where they
have entered in violation of law.
Here again however I have reservations highlighted by modes of implementa-
tion. On the question of hollow citizenship, it is not clear that the proposal would
mark much of a change from the existing practice of most states (as Shachar ap-
pears to recognize). Nor would it necessarily bolster the meaningful attachment
of external citizens. Globalization enables the maintenance of some level of con-
nection, even if not at a level equivalent to those of resident citizens. For in-
stance, external citizens might retain property in the homeland or undertake
post-secondary education there, which would appear to satisfy the jus nexi
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2threshold and to evidence a genuine connection. Mechanisms to police attach-
ment inevitably diminish autonomy. Who is to say when a connection has be-
come hollow in any case in which the individual prefers to retain the identity
represented by the citizenship tie? Witness the increasing rarity of forced expa-
triation among liberal democracies. At the same time external citizens will al-
most always participate in a state-defined society at a lower level of intensity
than resident citizens. Any regime to police against lack of attachment could
also be gamed for instrumental purposes. To the extent citizenship remains a
valuable commodity, at least citizenship in certain states, individuals would act
strategically to satisfy the new rules, which would inevitably fall short of actu-
ally measuring ‘actual membership’.
Meanwhile, the trend in state practice is toward greater tolerance for tenuous
ties. States are increasingly reaching out to diaspora communities for instru-
mental purposes, by way of tapping into the economic power they often repre-
sent relative to homeland residents2.Among the primary tools for cementing this
connection are lowered barriers to the retention or acquisition of citizenship
among diaspora populations. There has been a dramatic shift towards accept-
ance and even embrace of dual citizenship. Emigrants in most cases retain their
original citizenship by default even as they naturalize in their new country of res-
idence. More states are allowing non-residents to claim citizenship on the basis
of attenuated national lineage, such as single grandparent. Few impose contin-
uing obligations on external citizens; taxes and military service are now mostly
contingent on residency3.The result is something like ethnizenship, in Christian
Joppke’s terms4, a concept at least in tension with Shachar’s call to more closely
to align citizenship with active engagement.This trend is largely unidirectional.
It creates a feedback loop that reinforces the decline of citizenship. Hollow cit-
izens make for hollow citizenship. Shachar may lament the trend, but it will re-
inforce the erosion of citizenship as an institution. If citizens feel nothing more
than a thin ancestral bond with other citizens, it is unlikely to support robust re-
distributive capacities for the state.
Extending citizenship to those who are already members as a matter of social
fact, thus correcting the problem of underinclusiveness, is less problematic. Oth-
ers have called for the extension of citizenship essentially as of right after a cer-
tain period of presence5.As with Shachar, these proposals are aimed at achieving
a better match between the social boundaries of community and the citizenry, by
way of perfecting self-governance values. Under conventional understandings of
the society/territory matrix, it is difficult to challenge the logic of these propos-
als, at least in the frame of liberalism6.
But those conventional understandings may no longer hold.Territorial presence
no longer necessarily reflects social membership.This is evidenced by the grow-
ing population of individuals who fail to naturalize even when eligible. Shachar
avoids the autonomy-diminishing aspects of Ruth Rubio-Marin’s proposal to
automatically extend citizenship to long-term residents7, but that leaves the phe-
nomenon of the persistent denizen—and the challenge it poses to liberal gov-
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bership supplies additional evidence that citizenship is no longer a valuable com-
modity.
Second, there is a growing population that effectively segregates itself notwith-
standing long-term residence and who are not as a matter of social fact members
of the community, as territory and community become decoupled at home. This
is specially enabled among large diaspora concentrations. Within these groups,
it may be both literally and metaphorically the case that residents are not “rub-
bing elbows at country stores” (172) with members of the existing community.
Should those residents be eligible for citizenship? Even persistent territorial pres-
ence may not correlate with community solidarities; physical presence and the
“passage of time” do not necessarily establish “social connectedness” (179).
It would be interesting to have Shachar’s take on citizenship tests, the liberal-
democratic purpose of which is to measure some form of community integra-
tion8. Leaving aside insurmountable problems of design (in multicultural
societies, it is increasingly impossible to delineate a common knowledge set
shared by members of an existing community), if in theory such a test could
measure social connectedness it would seem consistent with the premise of cit-
izenship’s social content. But to the extent such tests exclude some residents
from citizenship, as with the persistent denizen phenomenon the resulting ex-
clusions detach membership from territory. On the other hand, to the extent
Shachar’s vision of citizenship has no social content, and jus nexi operates en-
tirely on the basis of territorial location, it begins to look arbitrary, too. If terri-
torial proximity does not establish social solidarity, it is not clear why location
should result in membership nor how a community so constituted will sustain the
political collective.
Finally, it’s not clear how the model would confront circular migration.What of
the naturalized citizen who returns permanently to her homeland? In the United
States, an increasing number of immigrants are naturalizing for the very pur-
pose of permanently returning to their homeland, by way of securing absolute
rights of re-entry. Shachar’s approach might harken back to long abandoned US
nationality regime under which such a citizen would forfeit his citizenship after
three years’ residence in his country of origin9. Meanwhile, the most effective
mechanism for policing against attenuated external citizenship would be to res-
urrect previous bars to dual citizenship, which would effectively raise the cost
of maintaining secondary national ties.Where dual citizenship is prohibited, in-
dividuals are forced to choose among citizenships for which they are eligible.
The necessary ranking that results would tend to advance Shachar’s normative
agenda insofar as individuals would be most likely to choose the citizenship of
the state in which they have the greater level of social connectedness. But
Shachar (albeit in a somewhat cursory fashion, at pp. 66 and 179) appears to ac-
cept dual citizenship, as she and other liberal nationalists must, for globalization
clearly enables individuals now to establish and to maintain actual members in
more than one national society.
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2It is ultimately the binary nature of citizenship that undermines citizenship-based
models against the backdrop of deep transnational interpenetrations and scalar
national affiliations. In the old world, the one in which state boundaries more
closely coincided with community boundaries, citizenship made sense as an or-
ganizing principle, reflecting and perfecting social membership on the ground.
In that context, Shachar’s optic would have had normative traction as a basis
for global redistribution. No doubt today there remains an imperative need to de-
vise weapons against global inequality. Highlighting the moral quandaries of
birthright citizenship may or may not help advance those efforts.
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2NOTES
1 See Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages,
Princeton University Press, 2006.
2 See, e.g., the essays collected in a symposium, “The Construction of Citizenship in an
Emigration Context”, 81 NYU L. Rev. 1 (2006).
3 The imposition of continuing obligations on non-citizens (especially taxes) would supply
a tool to police against hollow citizens. To the extent that an individual maintain no con-
tinuing affective attachments, she will presumably be unwilling to pay for it. In fact, the
leading motivation for the renunciation of U.S. citizenship is tax avoidance. See “More
Americans Expatriates Give Up Citizenship”, N.Y. Times,April 25, 2010. That most
states do not pursue this strategy is evidence of their weak bargaining position vis-￠-vis
diaspora populations and the defensive nature of efforts to extend citizenship to emi-
grants.
4 See Christian Joppke, Selecting By Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State, Har-
vard University Press, 2005.
5 See, e.g., Joseph Carens, Immigrants and the Right to Stay, MIT Press, 2010.Avariant
calls for the extension to aliens of constitutional status equivalent to citizenship, in Linda
Bosniak’s conception, “the citizenship of aliens.” See Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the
Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, Princeton University Press, 2006. This
strategy for expanding the rights of territorially present noncitizens is vulnerable to the
same critique as I here apply to Shachar’s work. Both overestimate the value of citizen-
ship and the national territorial segmentation of community boundaries.
6 See Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, Polity Press, 2010, p. 36.
7 See Ruth Rubio-Marin, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclu-
sion in Germany and the United States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.
8 For one recent collection of short essays on the subject, see Rainer Baub￶ck & Christian
Joppke, “How LiberalAre CitizenshipTests?”, Robert Schuman Centre forAdvanced Stud-
ies, European Union Institute, Working Paper No. RSCAS 2010/41, 2010 (with contribu-
tions from Christian Joppke, Joseph Carens, Randall Hansen, and Dora Kostakopoulou,
among others).
9 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (striking down statute as unconstitutional dis-
crimination against naturalized citizen).
10 See Peter J. Spiro, “Dual Citizenship:APostnational View”, in Thomas Faist & Peter
Kivisto (eds.), Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
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